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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the reaction of global financial markets across  
38 economies to the COVID-19 outbreak, with a special focus on the dynamics of capital 
flow across 14 emerging market economies. Using daily data over the period 4 January 
2010 to 30 April 2020 and controlling for a host of domestic and global macroeconomic and 
financial factors, we use a fixed effects panel approach and a structural VAR framework to 
show that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than advanced economies. In 
particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have experienced the sharpest impact 
on stocks, bonds, and exchange rates due to COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial 
capital outflows. Our results indicate that fiscal stimulus packages introduced in response to 
COVID-19, as well as quantitative easing by central banks, have helped to restore overall 
investor confidence through reducing bond yields and boosting stock prices. Our findings 
also highlight the role that global factors and developments in the world’s leading financial 
centers have on financial conditions in EMEs. Importantly, the impact of COVID-19 related 
quantitative easing measures by central banks in advanced countries, which helped to lower 
sovereign bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, extended to EMEs, notably in 
relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. Going forward, while the ultimate resolution of 
COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty declines, our 
impulse response analysis suggests that there may be some permanent effects on financial 
markets and capital flows as a result of COVID-19, particularly in EMEs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
COVID-19 has truly been a global shock. The pandemic and the resulting lockdowns 
have led to an unprecedented economic contraction and turbulences in financial 
markets, causing the largest ever outflow of portfolio capital from emerging market 
economies (EMEs). This paper is aimed at gaining insight into the impact of COVID-19 
on global financial market and capital flow dynamics. Using a panel regression and 
panel structural VAR approach with daily data over the period January 2010 to April 
2020, we assess the impact of COVID-19 on bond yields, stock prices, and exchange 
rates for a sample of 38 advanced and emerging markets. We also examine how equity 
and bond flows from a sample of 14 EMEs have been affected by COVID-19.  
We conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis to contribute to the growing literature 
on the financial market impact of COVID-19 in three ways. First, our analysis 
incorporates three asset markets, as well as capital flows, in a consistent econometric 
set-up. Second, our analysis is applied to a global sample of countries, which is  
of crucial importance, particularly given that global markets are increasingly 
interconnected and that COVID-19 constitutes an example of a global exogenous 
shock to markets. Prevailing empirical studies to date, have tended to focus on  
single country analyses and on specific asset markets. Third, we use two alternative 
econometric techniques to draw our conclusions. These approaches – which also 
control for a variety of domestic factors as well as global spillovers – enable 
comparisons to be made in the financial markets that have been most affected by 
COVID-19 at the global level, and also enable us to determine whether the virus may 
have lasting effects on the markets.  
Overall, we find that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than 
advanced economies. In particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have 
experienced the sharpest impacts on stocks, bonds, and exchange rates due to 
COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial capital outflows. Fiscal stimulus packages 
introduced in response to COVID-19, as well as quantitative easing by central banks, 
helped to restore overall investor confidence through reducing bond yields and 
boosting stock prices. Our findings underline the role that global factors and 
developments in the world’s leading financial centers have on financial conditions in 
EMEs. Our results also highlight the major role of central banks in stabilizing financial 
markets globally during the COVID-19 crisis, through special quantitative easing (QE) 
measures introduced as well as international central bank swap lines, and interest rate 
reductions. Importantly, the impact of QE measures by advanced economy central 
banks also extended to EMEs, notably in relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. In 
addition, QE measures by EME central banks themselves appear to have had 
significant effects in stabilizing capital flows. Going forward, while the ultimate 
resolution of COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty 
declines, our impulse response analysis suggests that there may be some small 
permanent effects on financial markets and capital flows as a result of COVID-19, 
particularly in EMEs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on the dynamics of asset prices and capital flows during the periods of 
heightened uncertainty, as well as previous studies on the economic and financial 
impact of COVID-19. Section 3 presents the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper contributes to the literature on asset price and capital flow dynamics during 
periods of heightened uncertainty. During such episodes, the typical response of 
markets is a flight to safety due to risk aversion (e.g., Beirne and Gieck 2014). Our 
paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of pandemics as the 
source of uncertainty related to markets and capital flows.  
Ramelli and Wagner (2020) discuss the impact of US firms’ trade and financial policies 
on US stock prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. They make the point that investors 
retreated from the stocks of US firms that were highly exposed to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), in line with the traditional response of markets to increase in 
times of uncertainty. As the virus spread to Europe and the US, investors became more 
concerned about the financial conditions of firms located in these areas, particularly 
those with high debt and/or low liquidity, with negative repercussion for stock prices.  
Baker et al. (2020) find that the impact of COVID-19 on US stock market volatility is 
much greater than that of previous pandemics that occurred since the year 1900, in 
particular due to the economic ramifications of containment policies. Substantial effects 
on stock market volatility due to COVID-19 have also been stressed by Zhang et al. 
(2020). Other papers that focus on the implications of COVID-19 for stock markets 
include Alfaro et al. (2020) and Landier et al. (2020). Hördahl and Shim (2020) examine 
the impact of COVID-19 on the relationship between bond portfolio outflows and 
exchange rates, and between bond outflows and long-term interest rates in 19 EMEs. 
They find that bond portfolio outflows from EMEs were indeed related to currency 
depreciations and long-term interest rates, but with some difficulty in ascertaining the 
direction of causality. The impulse responses generated from our panel structural VAR 
approach will help to address this issue. On bond markets, Haddad et al. (2020) 
examine disruptions to the US debt market due to COVID-19 and the role played by 
interventions by the Federal Reserve. They find that while investors initially shifted out 
of bonds towards more liquid securities to raise cash, Federal Reserve purchases of 
corporate bonds helped to alleviate the disruption in the bond market. Related to this, 
Caballero and Simsek (2020) discuss the important role of large-scale asset purchases 
by central banks to cope with downward asset price spirals and severe aggregate 
demand contractions following a large supply-side shock such as that caused by 
COVID-19. Adopting an event-study approach, Hartley and Rebucci (2020) find that 
COVID-19 related quantitative easing measures introduced by advanced and emerging 
economies had a dampening effect on sovereign bond yields (particularly in emerging 
economies, many of which had introduced QE measures for the first time). Arslan et al. 
(2020) also find that QE announcements by central banks in emerging markets were 
effective in lowering local currency bond yields and restoring investor confidence. On 
central bank swap lines introduced in response to COVID-19, Bahaj and Reis (2020a) 
and Bahaj and Reis (2020b) find significant effects in lowering deviations in covered 
interest parity (CIP).1  
More generally on capital flow dynamics, McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) indicate that 
a pandemic tends to lead to a major shift in capital from the more to the less affected 
economies. In regard to EMEs, Hofmann et al. (2020) suggest that borrowing through 
local currency bonds has not helped to insulate these economies from financial 
tensions. Indeed, many EME local currency bond spreads spiked amid sharp currency 
depreciations and capital outflows. Overall, they find that EMEs with monetary policy 
1  On international swap lines and the role of the global financial safety net during the COVID-19 crisis, 
see Gallagher et al. (2020). 
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frameworks that addressed the feedback loop between exchange rate depreciation  
and capital outflows had a greater likelihood of mitigating the detrimental impact of 
COVID-19. 
Our paper also contributes to the broader literature on the economic effects of  
COVID-19 and other pandemics. These wider effects undoubtedly are also manifested 
in financial market and capital flow dynamics, which are the main focus of our paper. In 
general, pandemics impact the economy through both the supply and demand sides of 
the economy and can be transmitted via trade, financial, and travel/tourism channels 
(e.g., see Correia et al. (2020) who ascribe the downturn in the US economy during the 
Great Influenza to demand and supply factors). Verikios et al. (2011) find that 
economic activity is more strongly affected by a pandemic that has a high infection rate 
as opposed to a high virulence rate (i.e., the ability of the virus to harm the host). They 
suggest that the more integrated a region to the world economy is, the more likely it  
will be affected by a pandemic. Jordà et al. (2020) find that the economic impact of a 
pandemic is different from those of war, as a pandemic does not involve the destruction 
of capital while war does. As such, a pandemic can be followed by a long period of 
excessive capital per surviving workers and rising real wage if the mortality rate among 
productive population segments is high, such as in the case of 14th Century Black 
Death and the Great Influenza. On the contrary, Garrett (2013) finds that the economic 
effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic were rather short-term, although he also 
observed labor shortages and rising wages. A range of other papers on pandemics 
tend to examine the economic costs. For example, Barro et al. (2020) suggest that  
the Great Influenza can provide a plausible worst-case scenario for the mortality rates 
and economic contraction for an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Great Influenza 
mortality rate was 2.1% of the world’s total population and caused an average GDP 
decline of 6%. In April 2020, the IMF (2020) revised its global GDP growth projection 
for 2020 to -3.0%, compared to +3.3% prior to the pandemic. The Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) (2020) estimated that the economic losses of COVID-19 could reach  
6.4% of global GDP ($5.8 trillion) under a 3-month containment scenario and 9.7% of 
global GDP ($8.8 trillion) over a 6-month containment scenario. Other similar effects  
on GDP were carried out in studies by Maliszewska et al. (2020), Boissay and 
Rungcharoenkitkul (2020), and McKibbin and Fernando (2020).  
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
First, using a daily data frequency, we use a fixed-effects panel model over the period 
from 4 January 2010 to 30 April 2020 across 38 advanced and emerging economies  
to examine the effects of COVID-19 on bond yields, stock prices, and exchange rates.  
For the assessment of the impact on equity and bond flows, data availability over the 
same time period limits our country sample to 14 EMEs.2 We consider the following 
regression in our first stage: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶19𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,
𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵,𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵}###   (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is either the 10-year government bond yield, the 
stock prices, the effective exchange rate, equity flows, or debt flows of country i at time 
t. Our key explanatory variable 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶19𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is defined as daily new cases per one 
2  See Table A1 in Appendix A for the full list of countries by regional sub-group. 
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million population. The domestic controls 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  include the central bank policy rate, a 
dummy variable for COVID-19 related quantitative easing announcements by central 
banks, a dummy variable for fiscal stimulus packages announced by national 
governments in response to COVID-19, a dummy variable for international central bank 
swap announcements by central banks due to COVID-19,3 the consumer price index 
(CPI), the industrial production index, the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index, which 
measures contemporaneous economic surprises in macroeconomic data, and financial 
market indicators referring to bond yields, stock prices, and effective exchange rates.45 
EPU stands for the US Daily News Index, a measure of global economic policy 
uncertainty (Baker et al. 2020). VIX stands for the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) Volatility Index, a measure of global risk aversion. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 represents country fixed 
effects; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. All the control variables are lagged by one period to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
Second, a structural panel VAR is used to examine the response of financial markets 
and capital flows to shocks from COVID-19. Crucially, shocks control for a range of 
domestic and global factors. The panel SVAR is implemented in the same sample used 
in the first stage. The panel SVAR can be denoted as follows in its general 
specification, with structural shocks identified by a recursive restriction: 
𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡#  (2) 
where 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) is the matrix of the lag polynomial; 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  refers to the demeaned value of 
endogenous variables of country i to accommodate country-specific fixed effects; and 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of structural disturbances. The ordering of the variables is imposed in a 
recursive form (Christiano et al. 1999), which results in the following matrix A to fit a 
just-identified model: 
𝐴𝐴 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑎𝑎1,1 0 … 0
𝑎𝑎2,1 ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
𝑎𝑎11,1 … 𝑎𝑎11,10 𝑎𝑎11,11⎦⎥⎥
⎤
  (3) 
We place our COVID-19 variable at the top in the ordering, which implies that it will 
only be affected by contemporaneous shock to itself. Following the COVID-19 variable, 
we place the global economic policy uncertainty variable second in the ordering, which 
implies that global factors will be affected by contemporaneous shocks to COVID-19 
and itself, but not by contemporaneous shocks to domestic factors or financial market 
indicators. Importantly, we put the financial market indicators in the last place in the 
ordering, which is not only based on the assumption that COVID-19 will affect the 
markets, but also on the consideration of our first-stage empirical results that imply the 
global and domestic factors that are driving the financial markets. Last, we place our 
3  We considered including dummies for the announcement of a program with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). However, only two countries in our sample received IMF support during the COVID-19 
crisis: Pakistan (Rapid Financing Instrument, 16 April) and Chile (Flexible Credit Line, 29 May 2020). At 
the time of writing, South Africa is in negotiations with the IMF. 
4  We drop the asset market indicator from 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 if it is used as the dependent variable in the left-hand side 
of the regression. 
5  See Table A2 in Appendix A for details of all variables used, including sources. Table B1 in Appendix B 
provides the dates of the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 for our sample of countries, plus the 
announcement dates and details of the fiscal and monetary policy measures introduced in response to 
COVID-19 for our sample period and countries. 
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domestic factors in the middle of the ordering. The panel VAR includes three lags 
selected by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Prior to examining the results from our panel regressions and panel structural VAR, it is 
useful to consider the trajectory of global financial markets and capital flows in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak (see Figures A1 to A4 in Appendix A). It can be 
seen that government bond yields initially declined globally given rising uncertainty 
amidst a bleak economic outlook, suggesting that investors considered sovereign 
bonds as safe haven assets at the time. On Black Monday (9 March 2020), financial 
markets panicked over the worsening of the COVID-19 pandemic and the concomitant 
oil price war between Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation. Stock markets tanked, 
while bond yields spiked. Even US Treasuries, usually considered the ultimate safe 
haven asset, were dropped as investors were desperate for cash (Schrimpf et al. 2020; 
Tooze 2020a). Central banks, particularly those in advanced economies, responded 
quickly with interventions ‘on an unprecedented scale’ and helped to avert ‘a full-scale 
meltdown’ (Tooze 2020b). Large scale asset purchases of sovereign bonds by the US 
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and other central 
banks helped to stabilize the situation and led to a significant decline in sovereign  
bond yields in advanced economies. Following this spike, yields generally trended 
downwards globally. Substantial COVID-19 related fiscal measures were also 
introduced by national governments, which further reinforced the actions of central 
banks. Figure A6 demonstrates some cross-country heterogeneity in the magnitudes of 
the fiscal response to the crisis, with some countries such as Japan and New Zealand 
bringing in new fiscal measures equating to over 20% of GDP. Our empirical approach 
controls for the effects of COVID-19 related monetary and fiscal policy measures 
introduced using announcement date dummy variables. 
In regard to stocks prices, these had started to slump already in February 2020, but 
then dropped sharply at the global level on Black Monday. Stocks recovered somewhat 
during April, as containment measures imposed by infected countries began to be 
relaxed, and liquidity measures by central banks had positive spillover effects on  
stock markets. On exchange rates and capital flow developments, EMEs as a whole 
experienced sharp currency depreciations and substantial capital outflows as COVID-
19 took hold. This was reflected in the typical pattern observed in global financial 
markets during periods of heightened uncertainty. The scale of capital flight, however, 
was unprecedented: during February and March 2020, EMEs experienced portfolio 
capital outflows totaling around $100 billion, triple the number of outflows during the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (Georgieva 2020). Indeed, both equity and bond outflows 
from EMEs were much faster and more pronounced than during previous episodes of 
EME turmoil, including the 2013 Taper Tantrum, the 2015 China Scare, and the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (GCF) (Figure A5). The spike in bond yields after Black Monday 
was extraordinarily large and steep, but unlike previous episodes of EME turmoil, bond 
yields returned to their original levels after around a month. Exchange rate devaluation 
of EMEs was broadly similar to those seen during the GCF, which is also true for stock 
price changes.  
Our panel regression results help to shed more light on the developments in global 
markets and EMEs in particular due to COVID-19. Tables 1 to 4 display the impact of 
COVID-19 on sovereign bond yields, stock prices, effective exchange rates, and EME 
capital flows, respectively. 
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Table 1: COVID-19 Impact on Sovereign Bond Yields 
 Full 
Sample Advanced Emerging 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  All Europe Asia All Europe Asia Latin 
COVID-19 –0.032*** –0.026*** –0.025*** –0.002*** –0.036*** –0.244*** –0.137*** –0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.026) (0.003) 
Domestic controls 
Stock prices –1.091*** –0.937*** –0.0738 0.0367 –0.582*** –1.536*** –1.696*** –0.336*** 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.052) (0.036) (0.021) (0.047) (0.049) (0.024) 
Exch. rate –0.769*** –3.741*** –6.667*** 1.893*** –0.550*** –0.477 –2.403*** –2.465*** 
 (0.076) (0.144) (0.316) (0.081) (0.065) (0.317) (0.119) (0.105) 
Policy rate 0.716*** 1.478*** 2.922*** 0.585*** 0.554*** 0.405*** 0.382*** 0.396*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.026) (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) 
QE –0.058 –0.593*** –0.414*** 0.271 0.328 0.299 –0.049 0.375 
 (0.198) (0.173) (0.017) (0.339) (0.274) (0.549) (0.148) (0.397) 
Fiscal –1.085*** –0.757*** –0.713* –0.0710 –0.452** –0.0382 –0.280 –0.291 
 (0.194) (0.274) (0.429) (0.116) (0.190) (0.480) (0.215) (0.467) 
CB swap –1.751*** –0.901** –0.548 0.112 0.156 n/a n/a –0.595 
 (0.335) (0.388) (0.515) (0.339) (0.861)   (0.758) 
Inflation –0.491*** –2.839*** 0.859** –7.507*** –0.313*** –11.62*** 1.649*** –4.383*** 
 (0.074) (0.204) (0.344) (0.126) (0.057) (0.407) (0.092) (0.102) 
Ind. prod. –2.069*** –3.821*** –5.139*** –0.854*** –0.851*** –2.647*** 0.0813 –0.621*** 
 (0.053) (0.092) (0.119) (0.056) (0.043) (0.180) (0.054) (0.104) 
Citi surprise 0.845*** 0.527*** 0.268*** 0.578*** 1.640*** 1.997*** 1.362*** 1.375*** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.064) (0.041) (0.047) (0.158) (0.077) (0.059) 
Global controls 
EPU 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.0465** –0.124*** –0.0510*** 0.257*** –0.136*** –0.296*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) 
VIX 0.477*** 0.161*** –0.015 –0.021 0.547*** 0.267*** 0.159*** 0.679*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.036) (0.014) (0.016) (0.033) (0.024) (0.027) 
Adv. QE n/a n/a n/a n/a –0.266*** –0.588*** –0.170 0.104 
     (0.0947) (0.190) (0.133) (0.174) 
Constant 20.17*** 52.74*** 50.81*** 28.35*** 6.335*** 70.97*** 13.90*** 35.15*** 
 (0.623) (1.086) (2.283) (0.498) (0.545) (2.526) (0.836) (1.125) 
Observations 100,945 61,939 40,395 13,465 39,006 8,079 14,769 10,772 
R-squared 0.306 0.334 0.413 0.509 0.525 0.808 0.435 0.634 
# countries 38 23 15 5 15 3 6 4 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
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Table 2: COVID-19 Impact on Stock Prices 
 Full 
Sample Advanced Emerging 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  All Europe Asia All Europe Asia Latin 
COVID-19 –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.006*** –0.027*** –0.008** –0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Domestic controls 
Sov. yield –0.020*** –0.011*** –0.001 0.002 –0.035*** –0.077*** –0.043*** –0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Exch. rate 0.473*** –0.094*** 0.650*** –1.491*** 0.709*** 1.833*** 0.752*** 0.667*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) (0.068) (0.018) (0.043) 
Policy rate –0.024*** –0.020*** –0.110*** –0.025*** –0.011*** –0.008*** –0.002* –0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
QE 0.084*** 0.120*** 0.204*** 0.273*** 0.044 0.035 0.058** 0.144 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.050) (0.080) (0.035) (0.123) (0.024) (0.159) 
Fiscal 0.0243 0.0020 0.085** 0.003 0.081* 0.094 0.046 0.073 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.046) (0.108) (0.034) (0.187) 
CB swap 0.059 0.064 0.153*** 0.0513 0.126 n/a n/a 0.039 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.049) (0.080) (0.210)   (0.304) 
Inflation 1.084*** 2.011*** 1.853*** 2.338*** 1.120*** 1.062*** 1.128*** 0.503*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.032) (0.027) (0.013) (0.095) (0.012) (0.044) 
Ind. prod. 0.504*** 0.678*** 0.750*** 0.223*** 0.312*** 0.237*** 0.287*** –0.155*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.041) (0.008) (0.042) 
Citi surprise 0.160*** 0.181*** 0.174*** 0.306*** 0.150*** 1.006*** 0.088*** 0.059** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.034) (0.012) (0.024) 
Global controls 
EPU –0.016*** –0.027*** –0.020*** 0.003** 0.002 0.011*** –0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002 (0.006) 
VIX –0.087*** –0.094*** –0.052*** –0.111*** –0.037*** –0.037*** –0.080*** 0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) 
Adv. QE n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.0795*** 0.255*** 
     (0.023) (0.043) (0.021) (0.070) 
Constant –1.663*** –4.644*** –8.026*** 1.920*** –1.471*** –11.78*** –1.583*** 5.483*** 
 (0.0833) (0.117) (0.216) (0.130) (0.133) (0.578) (0.134) (0.468) 
Observations 100,945 61,939 40,395 13,465 39,006 8,079 14,769 10,772 
R-squared 0.356 0.417 0.410 0.648 0.359 0.486 0.745 0.135 
# countries 38 23 15 5 15 3 6 4 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
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Table 3: COVID-19 Impact on Effective Exchange Rates 
 Full 
Sample Advanced Emerging 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  All Europe Asia All Europe Asia Latin 
COVID-19 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** –0.001*** 0.001*** –0.006*** –0.004** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Domestic controls 
Sov. yield –0.001*** –0.003*** –0.002*** 0.020*** –0.003*** –0.001 –0.011*** –0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exch. rate 0.046*** –0.006*** 0.017*** –0.286*** 0.073*** 0.045*** 0.136*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Policy rate 0.006*** 0.038*** 0.018*** –0.024*** 0.002*** 0.016*** –0.015*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
QE 0.047*** 0.016 0.019** –0.121*** 0.059*** 0.003 0.015 0.025 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.035) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.036) 
Fiscal 0.016* 0.014* 0.018*** –0.028** –0.009 0.019 0.001 –0.095** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.042) 
CB swap 0.029** 0.025** 0.026*** –0.003 –0.197*** n/a n/a –0.110 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.035) (0.068)   (0.068) 
Inflation –0.385*** 0.325*** 0.0157*** 1.228*** –0.519*** 0.068*** –0.254*** –0.805*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ind. prod. 0.069*** –0.035*** –0.036*** 0.049*** 0.149*** –0.175*** 0.036*** 0.061*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) 
Citi surprise –0.049*** –0.011*** –0.026*** 0.079*** –0.018*** 0.040*** –0.051*** 0.012** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Global controls 
EPU 0.007*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.005*** –0.002** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
VIX –0.015*** –0.011*** –0.004*** –0.023*** –0.012*** –0.007*** 0.014*** –0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Adv. QE n/a n/a n/a n/a –0.004 0.021*** –0.008 0.007 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
Constant 5.978*** 3.388*** 4.723*** 0.618*** 5.758*** 4.420*** 4.894*** 7.887*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0575) (0.0313) (0.0784) (0.0409) (0.0721) 
Observations 100,945 61,939 40,395 13,465 39,006 8,079 14,769 10,772 
R-squared 0.164 0.185 0.065 0.607 0.375 0.600 0.372 0.668 
#countries 38 23 15 5 15 3 6 4 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
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Table 4: COVID-19 Impact on EME Capital Flows 
 (1) (2) 
 Equity Flows Bond Flows 
COVID-19 –0.009*** –0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Domestic Controls 
Exchange rate 0.492*** –0.344*** 
 (0.013) (0.044) 
Stock prices –0.413*** –0.681*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) 
Government bond yield –0.033*** –0.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) 
Policy rate –0.001* –0.027*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
QE 0.142*** 0.155** 
 (0.022) (0.063) 
Fiscal 0.091*** –0.044 
 (0.030) (0.130) 
CB swap 0.0122 n/a 
 (0.087)  
Inflation 0.967*** 3.354*** 
 (0.012) (0.042) 
Industrial production 0.293*** 0.702*** 
 (0.008) (0.040) 
Citi macro surprise –0.034*** –1.430*** 
 (0.009) (0.043) 
Global controls 
EPU –0.024*** –0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
VIX –0.069*** –0.248*** 
 (0.003) (0.011) 
Advanced QE 0.023*** 0.266*** 
 (0.007) (0.066) 
Constant 7.865*** 8.116*** 
 (0.098) (0.371) 
Observations 21,579 13,442 
R-squared 0.396 0.676 
#countries 9 5 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
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In terms of the magnitude of the effect of COVID-19 on financial markets, these are 
notably higher for emerging rather than advanced economies across bond, stocks, and 
exchange rates, particularly for European and Asian EMEs. Importantly, these results 
control for a vast number of domestic and global factors, the coefficient signs of which 
(where significant) are largely in alignment with priors.6  
On sovereign bond yields, Table 1 shows that COVID-19 has had a significant 
dampening effect across all advanced and emerging economies. The results in column 
(1) indicate that for every additional new confirmed case of COVID-19 per million of the 
population, bond yields have declined across our global sample of 38 economies by 
around 0.03 percentage points.7 This effect on yields also applies to the advanced 
economy sub-groups in our sample. However, the largest effect on yields can be  
seen in EMEs. In particular, the virus has led to a reduction in bond yields in European 
and Asian EMEs by around 0.24 and 0.14 percentage points respectively.8 This finding 
may seem counter-intuitive, as one might expect an increase in COVID-19 cases  
to worsen financial market turmoil and also increase sovereign bond yields. There are 
two explanations why the overall effect on bond yields was negative. First, government 
bonds were perceived as safer assets than corporate bonds, given the corporate 
sector, with few exceptions, was very heavily affected by the COVID-19 lockdowns. 
With many businesses fighting for survival, sovereign bonds were seen as the better 
alternative, even if the crisis also cast questions on the sustainability of public debt. 
Secondly, the crisis gave way to extremely accommodative central bank policies in 
most places, with slashes in interest rates and new rounds of QE policies in all major 
advanced economies. As can be seen from the regression results, these measures,  
as well as central bank swap line announcements, were highly effective in bringing 
down sovereign bond yields in advanced economies. Indeed, the QE measures by 
advanced economy central banks also exhibited significant positive spillover effects to 
EMEs, lowering EME bond yields. Fiscal stimulus packages announced by national 
governments also helped to lower bond yields globally, both in advanced economies 
and EMEs. Interestingly, we find that the effects of QE announcements by EME central 
banks had no significant effect on domestic government bond yields. This is in contrast 
to the findings of Hartley and Rebucci (2020) and Arslan et al (2020), who use an event 
study analysis to show that QE announcements by central banks in EMEs have had 
significant dampening effects on bond yields. Unlike that analysis, however, our paper 
controls for a large number of domestic and global macroeconomic and financial bond 
yield determinants. It should be also noted that international central bank swaps played 
no meaningful role for EMEs, which is not surprising: among the beneficiaries of  
the bilateral currency swaps extended by the Federal Reserve of the United States 
were only two EMEs, Brazil and Mexico (Gallagher et al. 2020). On the controls, the 
expected negative relationship between bond yields and both inflation and industrial 
production holds across the vast majority of regional groups, while global financial 
market uncertainty, as proxied by the VIX, is also positively related to bond yields,  
as expected.  
  
6  As can be seen from Figures A7 to A10 in Appendix A, the panel models estimated appear to reflect 
well the trajectory of actual global asset market prices and EME capital flows. 
7  Given that our COVID-19 variable is defined as one new confirmed case per one million of the 
population, our results therefore imply a substantial accumulated effect of COVID-19 on financial 
markets and capital flows. 
8  See Table A3 in Appendix A for an alternative specification in relation to the effect of COVID-19 on EME 
sovereign bond yields, the results of which are fully in line with our baseline. 
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Turning to the impact on stock markets, Table 2 indicates that while the effect has been 
marginal relative to new COVID-19 cases confirmed in advanced economies, stock 
prices have declined most substantially in European EMEs by around 3%, compared to 
around 1% in EMEs in Asia and Latin America. Table 2 shows a strong impact of 
expansionary monetary policies (both through QE, swap arrangements, and interest 
rate reductions), on propping up stock markets. As in the case of the sovereign bond 
market, we find significant positive spillover effects of advanced economy COVID-19 
related QE to EME stock markets. As regards QE announcements by EME central 
banks, it is notable that these have been effective in Asian EMEs in supporting stock 
prices. On fiscal stimulus packages, these have been more important for stock markets 
in emerging rather than advanced economies. The controls are also in accordance  
with priors, e.g., a positive relationship with inflation and industrial production and a 
negative relationship with the VIX.  
On exchange rates, Table 3 shows that European and Asian EMEs have been  
most affected, experiencing currency depreciations due to COVID-19, although the 
magnitude of these effects is not as large overall when compared to the effects on 
stock and bond markets. QE and swap announcements by central banks in advanced 
and emerging economies overall appear to have been effective in supporting exchange 
rates, while the effect of fiscal stimulus packages on exchange rates is largely confined 
to advanced economies. 
In regard to EME capital flows, Table 4 indicates that COVID-19 has led to significant 
outflows of both equities and bonds, reflecting investors’ flights to safety. It is 
noteworthy that the QE measures announced by EMEs central banks has a significant 
effects on averting capital outflows, while positive QE spillovers are also evident from 
advanced economy central banks, i.e., advanced countries’ asset purchase programs 
not only helped to lower bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, they also 
helped to put a stop to capital flight from EMEs. 
Turning to the impulse responses from our panel structural VAR models (Figures A11 
to A14 in Appendix A), the results indicate that COVID-19 may have some small 
permanent effects on financial markets and capital flows, so that a full market 
correction to the pre COVID-19 financial market environment when the virus dissipates 
will not occur. Importantly, the direction of the impulse responses across all asset 
markets and capital flows are fully consistent with the signs of the COVID-19 
coefficients estimated in the earlier panel regression. Moreover, these impulse 
responses also control for the same full set of domestic and global factors. In addition, 
the duration at which the shocks become permanent on markets and capital flows lies 
somewhere in the range of 5 to 10 days. Finally, and also in line with the panel 
analysis, these permanent effects are most pronounced in magnitude for emerging 
economies in Europe and Asia.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
global financial markets and EME capital flow dynamics. Against the backdrop of 
globally interconnected financial markets, we examine the impact across sovereign 
bond and equity markets, as well as exchange rates and capital flows. Our analysis 
enables a comparative assessment to be made across advanced and emerging 
economies. Controlling for a large number of domestic and global financial and 
macroeconomic factors, our results suggest that COVID-19 has had the most 
substantial effects on financial markets in European and Asian EMEs. Moreover, EME 
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equity and bond outflows appear to be directly linked to COVID-19 given investor risk 
aversion and flight to safety. Sovereign bond markets in EMEs appear to have been 
most affected by COVID-19, compared to the magnitude of the effects on stock prices 
and exchange rates. In addition, while COVID-19 will ultimately subside, our results 
suggest that markets globally may experience some marginal permanent effects. 
Our results provide evidence that fiscal stimulus packages introduced by governments, 
along with comprehensive stabilization measures taken by central banks, have helped 
to alleviate the extent of the negative effects of COVID-19 on financial market and 
capital flow dynamics. In particular, our findings highlight the major role of central 
banks in stabilizing financial markets globally during the COVID-19 crisis, through 
interest rate reductions, QE, and international swap lines. Importantly, the impact of 
expansionary monetary policy in advanced countries, which helped to lower sovereign 
bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, extended also to EMEs, notably in 
relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. This, as well as the impact of global factors 
such as EPU and VIX, underlines the interconnectedness of the global financial 
system, and the impact that developments in the world’s leading financial centers have 
on the financial conditions of EMEs.9 
Heightened uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic has clearly affected the 
financial markets of EMEs more detrimentally than advanced economies. However, it 
appears that EMEs have performed strongly in their policy responses to the pandemic. 
While fiscal stimulus packages have contributed to restoring confidence in local 
markets, many EME central banks have embarked on quantitative easing for the first 
time. Our results would suggest that these monetary policy measures have been 
effective in the case of Asian EMEs, supporting stock prices. Importantly, these 
measures also helped to stabilize capital flows.  
Moreover, given the scale of bond and equity capital outflows from EMEs, our results 
highlight the importance of strengthening the domestic investor base to be less reliant 
on international portfolio investment, corroborating findings by Hofmann et al. (2020). 
Going forward, the COVID-19 crisis illustrates the need for concerted efforts at 
bolstering domestic financial resource mobilization in EMEs, and for reducing exposure 
to international portfolio capital and financial contagion. The extent of capital outflows 
also strengthens the case for reviving discussions around the management of capital 
flows and on the development of the global financial safety net. 
  
9  These findings are in line with previous research investigating the role of global factors on capital flows 
to EMEs (e.g., Belke and Volz 2019). 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Sample of Economies 
Advanced Emerging 
Europe Asia Other Europe Asia 
Latin 
America Other 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Slovakia 
Czech Republic 
Japan 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Republic of 
Korea 
Singapore 
Taipei,China 
Australia 
New Zealand 
United States 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Poland 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
People’s Republic 
of China 
Philippines 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Peru 
South Africa 
Tunisia 
Note: The EME economy sample for capital flows comprises the following for equity flows – Brazil, the People’s 
Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China; 
and the following for bond flows - India, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa. 
Table A2: Overview of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis 
Variable Data Source Definition 
COVID-19 WHO The number of daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases per one 
million population. 
10-year government 
bond yield 
Bloomberg 10-year government bond yield. 
Stock price Bloomberg Stock price index. 
Exchange rate BIS and Bloomberg Effective exchange rate index. 
Policy rate IMF and CEIC Central bank policy rate.  
QE National central banks Dummy variable defined as 1 for announcement date of 
quantitative easing measures introduced by central banks in 
response to COVID-19, and zero otherwise. 
Fiscal  IMF Dummy variable defined as 1 for announcement date of fiscal 
stimulus measures introduced by national governments in 
response to COVID-19, and zero otherwise.  
CB swap National central banks Dummy variable defined as 1 for announcement date of swap 
arrangements by central banks in response to COVID-19, and 
zero otherwise. 
CPI CEIC Consumer price index (not available for April for some countries). 
Industrial production CEIC and OECD Industrial production index (not available for latest dates, some 
only cover until 2019). 
EPU index Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 
The US daily news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is 
based on newspaper archives from Access World New’s 
NewsBank service. 
Surprise Index Bloomberg Citigroup Economic Surprise Indices which are calculated as the 
normalized deviation of the actual data release from the market 
consensus prior to the release. For countries for which Surprise 
Indices are not provided we use the respective regional indices. 
VIX Bloomberg VIX stands for the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Volatility Index, a measure of global risk aversion. 
EME equity and bond 
flow 
IIF Accumulated portfolio equity and bond flows from EMEs. 
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Table A3: Alternative Specification for COVID-19 Impact  
on Government Bond Yields in EMEs 
COVID-19 –0.075*** 
 (0.015) 
Domestic controls 
Stock prices –0.674*** 
 (0.039) 
Exchange rate –0.807*** 
 (0.082) 
Bond flows –0.223*** 
 (0.022) 
Policy rate 0.759*** 
 (0.006) 
QE 0.156 
 (0.118) 
Fiscal –0.201 
 (0.241) 
Inflation 2.616*** 
 (0.100) 
Industrial production –0.696*** 
 (0.076) 
Citi macro surprise 2.959*** 
 (0.079) 
Global controls 
EPU –0.013 
 (0.011) 
VIX 0.378*** 
 (0.021) 
Advanced QE –0.407*** 
 (0.122) 
Constant –10.68*** 
 (0.691) 
Observations 13,442 
#countries 5 
R-squared 0.760 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Note: This specification refers to EMEs for which portfolio bond flow data was available. Standard errors in parentheses; 
***, **, * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively.  
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Figure A1: Government Bond Yields and COVID-19 
(1 October 2019 to 30 April 2020) 
 
Note: the shaded area denotes the period of the first confirmed COVID-19 case for countries in their respective regions. 
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Figure A2: Stock Price Indices and COVID-19 
(1 October 2019 to 30 April 2020) 
 
Note: the shaded area denotes the period of the first confirmed COVID-19 case for countries in their respective regions. 
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Figure A3: Effective Exchange Rates and COVID-19 
(1 October 2019 to 30 April 2020) 
 
Note: the shaded area denotes the period of the first confirmed COVID-19 case for countries in their respective regions. 
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Figure A4: EME Capital Flows and COVID-19 
(1 October 2019 to 30 April 2020) 
 
Note: the shaded area denotes the period of the first confirmed COVID-19 case for countries in their respective regions. 
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Figure A5: Financial Indicators During Market Turmoil in EMEs 
 
Note: The initial values are set to 100 as baseline index for government bond yields, stock prices, and effective 
exchange rates; the unit of cumulative capital flows data is one billion US dollars; the horizontal axis refers to the days 
after the starting date of the market turmoil. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations with data from Bloomberg, BIS and IIF. 
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Figure A6: COVID-19 Fiscal Stimulus Measures  
(total as % of GDP as at end April 2020) 
 
Source: IMF and CSIS. 
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Figure A7: Bond Yields vs Fitted 
 
Note: Red line represents actual value of government bond yield in percentage. Dark blue dashed line represents its 
fitted value. 
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Figure A8: Stock Prices vs Fitted 
 
Note: Red line represents actual value of stock prices in log form. Dark blue dashed line represents its fitted value. 
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Figure A9: Effective Exchange Rates vs Fitted 
 
Note: Red line represents actual value of nominal effective exchange rate in log form. Dark blue dashed line represents 
its fitted value. 
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Figure A10: Capital Flows vs Fitted 
 
Note: Red line represents actual value of capital flows in log form. Dark blue dashed line represents its fitted value. 
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Figure A11: Response of Sovereign Bond Yields to COVID Shock 
All Countries 
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Figure A12: Response of Stock Prices to COVID Shock 
All Countries 
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Figure A13: Response of Effective Exchange Rates to COVID Shock 
All Countries 
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Figure A14: Response of Capital Flows to COVID Shock 
Equity Flows 
 
Bond Flows 
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